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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
 
No. 15-1303 
 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
 
 JOSEPH WING, 
        Appellant 
 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 3-14-cr-00156-001) 
District Judge: Hon. James M. Munley 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 7, 2015 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 18, 2015) 
 
 
OPINION* 
 
  
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Joseph Wing, currently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary Canaan, in 
Waymart, Pennsylvania, appeals only that aspect of his sentence requiring him to pay 
restitution to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP).  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
 As we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our conclusion.1   
 We review restitution orders “under a bifurcated standard: plenary review as to 
whether restitution is permitted by law, and abuse of discretion as to the appropriateness 
of the particular award.”2  Because Wing did not object to the restitution order during 
sentencing, we review for plain error.3  
 The general rule is that federal court orders of restitution are proper only to the 
extent authorized by statute.4  The applicable statute, the Mandatory Victims Restitution 
Act (MVRA),5 permits payments not only to victims of crimes but also to third parties 
who provide monetary compensation for victims’ medical expenses.6  Wing bears the 
burden of establishing plain error regarding the restitution award by proving that (1) the 
court erred; (2) the error was obvious under the law at the time of review; and (3) the 
                                              
1 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
2 United States v. Quillen, 335 F.3d 219, 221 (3d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. 
Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1999).  
3 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993); 
United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2009). 
4 See United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 655-56 (6th Cir. 2012). 
5 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012). 
6 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(1) (2012). 
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error affected his substantial rights, that is, the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings.7   
 Wing argues that he need not pay restitution to the BOP because the BOP is not a 
“person directly or proximately harmed” by the attack.  Nor is it a third party, such as an 
insurance company, who provided monetary compensation for the victim’s expenses.8  
The only appellate court to address this situation in a precedential opinion held that, 
although the BOP was not a victim under the MVRA, awarding restitution to the BOP 
was appropriate.9  In United States v. Church, the Sixth Circuit concluded that under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3663A(b)(2) and 3664(j) the BOP deserved restitution as a third party medical 
provider.10  The Church court noted that other circuits had found that third party medical 
providers who pay for a victim’s treatment were entitled to restitution payments.11  Wing 
does not dispute the conclusion in the Presentence Report that the BOP incurred costs 
totaling $19,166.64 in treating the victim of his attack.  Accordingly, even though the 
BOP is not a “victim” per se under the MVRA, the District Court did not plainly err in 
ordering restitution.12 
 Wing argues in the alternative that the Federal Prisoner Health Care Copayment 
Act of 2000 (the Act),13 its corresponding regulation,14 and BOP policy,15 limit his 
                                              
7 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997). 
8 See § 3663A; § 3664(j)(1). 
9 See United States v. Church, 731 F.3d 530, 536-37 (6th Cir. 2013). 
10 Id.  
11 Id. at 536 (citing United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 200 (4th Cir. 2005) and 
United States v. Cliatt, 338 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
12 See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467. 
13 18 U.S.C. § 4048 (2012). 
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financial responsibility for the victim’s medical treatment to copayments only.  The Act 
requires an inmate who injures another inmate to be responsible for the copayments 
associated with treating the injury.16  The typical copayment is $2.00 per visit.17  Wing 
contends that, because the statute requires that copayments collected from a prisoner 
subject to an order of restitution shall be paid to the victim,18 he is required to pay only 
the copayment amounts for his victim’s medical treatment. 
 This argument is without merit.  Nothing on the face of the Act, its supporting 
regulation, or the BOP Program Statement asserts that copayments are to be the exclusive 
remedy in instances involving restitution, or that they somehow trump the language of the 
MVRA regarding injuries (and the resulting loss or cost) that arise in the context of 
inmate-on-inmate crime.  Moreover, Wing has not pointed to any caselaw, binding or 
otherwise, indicating that we should construe the Act as the controlling authority for 
imposing restitution here, and we have found none.   
 We also note that Wing’s interpretation of the relationship between the Act and 
the MVRA would contradict both the text of the MVRA and congressional intent.  The 
MVRA explicitly states that restitution shall include the “cost of necessary medical and 
related professional services and devices. . . .”19  Congress did not restrict restitution 
payments to the amount the victim must pay out of pocket.  Moreover, as the Church 
                                                                                                                                                  
14 28 C.F.R. § 549.70 (2015). 
15 BOP, PROGRAM STATEMENT, P-6031.02 (2005). 
16 See 18 U.S.C. §4048(c)(2); 28 C.F.R. §549.70(b)(2); BOP, PROGRAM STATEMENT, P-
6031.02(5)(b). 
17 See 28 C.F.R. § 549.70(b); BOP, PROGRAM STATEMENT, P-6031.02(5). 
18 See § 4048(g). 
19 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
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Court noted, Congress’ stated purpose in enacting the MVRA was “to ensure that the 
offender realizes the damage caused by the offense and pays the debt owed to the victim 
as well as to society.”20   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the reasoning of the District Court. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
20 S. REP. NO. 104–179, at 12 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925. 
